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Executive Summary 
 
In The Princess Bride, the lead kidnapper, Vizzini, dismisses missteps in his ill-fated 
scheme with a frustrated exclamation, “Inconceivable!” At length, his soft-spoken 
mercenary, Inigo Montoya, ventures: “You keep using that word. I do not think it means 
what you think it means.”1 An equivalent asymmetry in the world of economic analysis is 
the use of turnover on the Fortune 500 list. For years, many people have cited 
turnover—and ostensibly rising turnover—as a proxy for positive economic churn and 
rapid changes in the U.S. economy that are supposed to reflect underlying strengths in 
innovation and productivity.  
 
We find that, while annual turnover on the list has, on average, increased since the 
early 1980s, it doesn’t quite mean what many people think it means. 
 
On average, annual turnover (the number of spots on the list that change as companies 
enter and exit the top 500) was moderate in the late 1950s, then lower and steadier 
through the 1960s and 1970s. Beginning in the early 1980s, annual turnover rose to 
historically high levels; by the second half of the 1990s, it touched new highs. After 
2000, however, turnover returned to the moderate levels of the late 1950s. It’s easy to 
paint a narrative around these numbers that coincides with the Great Moderation and 
the productivity revolution of the 1990s and early 2000s. But reality isn’t so simple. 
 
For one thing, turnover among big companies is not a new phenomenon. The late 
1950s, as mentioned, experienced moderately high levels of turnover (at least 
compared to subsequent periods). Prior research has revealed considerable churn 
among big companies in the early decades of the twentieth century as well. Higher 
turnover in the 1980s did appear to reflect value creation as corporate conglomerates, 
ravaged by inflation and competition, were taken apart and remade into separate, more 
efficient companies. But, in the 1990s, higher turnover reflected (a) methodological 
changes in how the Fortune list was compiled, and (b) a mergers and acquisition boom, 
concentrated in a handful of sectors, that destroyed perhaps as much value as it 
created. Turnover is less a broad economic trend than a discrete temporal and sectoral 
phenomenon. 
 
Still, we point out that the Fortune 500 list—and its changes over time—does provide a 
meaningful window into American capitalism, even if it doesn’t mean what many think it 
means. It reflects a kaleidoscopic process of sectoral change and greater efficiencies at 
the level of individual firms, as well as some less sanguine economic developments. 
The latter includes the downside of higher volatility—the high M&A volume in the late 
1990s included the largest number of the worst deals of the past thirty years—and the 
deleterious implications for consumers and households. Finally, it appears as if 
performance among the Fortune 500, as measured by return on equity, did not 
necessarily improve and, if anything, became more volatile over time.
                                                        
1
 The Princess Bride (1987), at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0093779/quotes.  
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I. Overview and Background 
 
Out of approximately six million firms in the United States, less than one percent is 
publicly traded and an even smaller number, roughly 5,000, is traded on exchanges 
such as the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.2 This comparatively small 
number, however, plays an outsized economic role—by some estimates this fraction of 
companies employs nearly one-third of the American workforce.3 These are the 
businesses with which we all interact on a daily basis: McDonald’s, Apple, Exxon Mobil, 
Target, and so on. Their economic heft means that economists and commentators 
rightly pay a great deal of attention to changes among the ranks of publicly held 
companies: growth, shrinkage, mergers and acquisitions, initial public offerings, and so 
on. The relative stability or volatility of publicly traded firms is an important economic 
gauge. 
 
Here, we look at one popular measure—turnover on the Fortune 500 list. We find that, 
as others have claimed, annual turnover has on average risen over time. We set this 
turnover in historical context and look into various possible causes for this rise, from 
economic change to methodological explanations. We conclude that Fortune 500 
turnover offers a window into the marvelously complex ways that capitalism works, but 
the use to which many have put it as an economic indicator is overdone. 
 
Every spring since 1955, Fortune magazine has published a list of the largest public 
companies, by revenues, in the United States.4 The Fortune 500 (and 1,000) list has 
become a barometer of sorts, treated by many as a touchstone of economic change writ 
large.5 One salient feature of the list is annual turnover: while most of the list remains 
stable from year to year, a crop of different companies appears each time and, 
accordingly, other companies drop off. Such turnover is internal to the list itself: the fact 
that a company is ranked within the top 500 one year but not another doesn’t mean the 
company has gone out of business. In some cases, of course, a company has imploded 
or filed for bankruptcy. It might also be the result of merger, acquisition, being taken 
private, or simply falling below the rank of 500 relative to the performance of other 
companies.6 
                                                        
2
 The six million figure includes only employer firms, those that, naturally, have employees. The 
population of “nonemployer” firms and the self-employed is roughly six times as large. See Small 
Business Administration, The Small Business Economy, at http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/849/6282.  
3
 See Steven J. Davis and James A. Kahn, “Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility of 
Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro Levels,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22, Fall 2008, 
pages 155-180. 
4
 The Fortune methodology is explained here: 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/faq/.  
5
 For an original take on what the Fortune 500 list means, see the interesting report from the Partnership 
for a New American Economy, “The ‘New American’ Fortune 500,” June 2011, at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2011/partnership_for_a_new_american_economy_fortune_500.pdf. 
6
 Fortune acknowledges as much on its website: “Since 1955, when the first FORTUNE 500 was created, 
more than 1,800 companies have appeared on the list. Many of these companies have changed names 
over this period, owing to mergers, acquisitions, and bankruptcies. Other companies have gone private, 
or simply changed their names.” See 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1955/index.html.  
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Much amusement is derived from comparing Fortune 500 lists today to those of the 
1950s and 1960s, when companies like American Can, Youngstown Sheet & Tube, and 
RCA bestrode the U.S. economy. Not surprisingly, changes in the composition of the list 
have followed broader economic changes. In particular, turnover and how it rises or falls 
over time is taken as indicative of these macroeconomic changes. Yet the turnover 
estimates vary among commentators, both in the basic numbers and in how much 
meaning to ascribe to them. Here, for example, is a sampling of claims regarding 
Fortune 500 turnover from a basic Google search: 
 
 “In the 1980s it took just five years for one-third of the Fortune 500 to be 
replaced. And in the 1970s it took the entire decade to replace the Fortune 500. 
By contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s it took two decades.”7 
 “In the 1960s, fewer than 10 new businesses were added to the Fortune 500 list 
each year. Today, there are 50 per year. In other words, eight of America’s 25 
biggest firms today did not exist or were very small in 1960.”8 
 “[I]t took 20 years to replace one third of the Fortune 500 companies listed in 
1960, against four years for those listed in 1998.”9 
 “Two-thirds of the original 1955 list was gone within three decades.”10 
 “The rate at which large American companies left the Fortune 500 increased four 
times between 1970 and 1990.”11 
 “One simple measure of marketplace turmoil is the annual turnover in the 
Fortune 500. … Close to twice as many companies were replaced between 1998 
and 1999 as were between 1958 and 1959. This is a coarse measure, to be sure, 
and may understate the current pace of change.”12 
 “If change was as easy as a directive, then the companies that made 1999’s 
Fortune 500 list would not need to say goodbye to 238 of their peers a mere 10 
years later, a change of almost 50% from the 1999 Fortune 500 to the 2009 
Fortune 500. MIT Sloan School of Management professor, Peter Senge, 
presents the average life of a Fortune 500 company is [sic] 30 years. Jim Collins, 
author of Built to Last, notes only 71 companies on the original 1955 Fortune 500 
list are there today.”13 
 “Between 1998 and 2004, the turnover of Fortune 500 companies has been 
                                                        
7
 David Audretsch, Innovation and Industry Evolution (MIT, 1995). 
8
 Pieter Waasdorp, “Innovative Entrepreneurship: A Dutch Policy Perspective,” in Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands: Innovative Entrepreneurship. New Policy Challenges! 
(2002), at http://www.ondernemerschap.nl/pdf-ez/A200112.pdf.  
9
 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: Entrepreneurship in Europe 9 (2003), at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0027en01.pdf.  
10
 See William Shanklin, “Fortune 500 Dropouts,” Strategy & Leadership, vol. 14, p. 12 (1986). 
11
 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea 129 
(Modern Library, 2005). 
12
 John D. Donahue and Richard J. Zeckhauser, “Government’s Role When Markets Rule,” in John D. 
Donahue and Joseph S. Jr. (eds.), Governance Amid Bigger, Better Markets 282, 289 (Brookings, 2001). 
13
 Toby Elwin, “The Cost of Culture, a 50% Turnover of the Fortune 500,” 2010, at 
http://www.tobyelwin.com/the-cost-of-culture-a-50-turnover-of-the-fortune-500/.  
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staggering.”14 
 “A full one-third of the companies listed in the 1970 Fortune 500, for instance, 
had vanished by 1983—acquired, merged, or broken to pieces.”15 
 
In each of these sources, Fortune 500 turnover is treated as a proxy for innovation, 
productivity, and, generally, that things are improving all around. These claims are 
repeatedly, and uncritically, cited elsewhere, but it is difficult to ascertain how some of 
these calculations were made, or even what some of them mean. They range from 
interesting and verifiable, to irrelevant and potentially meaningless. 
 
With data provided by Ben Fry and the data analytics team at Fathom,16 we set out to 
test such claims by calculating annual turnover—what have been some trends over 
time? More importantly, we also explore the meaningfulness of this turnover—
economists look at all sorts of figures for insight into the economy, with disputes over 
what indicators actually mean.17 Taking into account its magnitude and the knowledge 
that such turnover is internal to the list itself, how much can and should we rely on 
Fortune list turnover as an economic indicator? None of this is meant to detract from the 
Fortune list itself—it is full of information about how the United States economic 
structure has evolved.18 But it is probably difficult to sum up anything about the list in 
one number alone. 
 
II. Descriptive Statistics of Fortune 500 Turnover, and Historical Perspective 
 
We start with basic presentation of the number of companies annually turning over in 
Figure 1. We exclude 1994 because Fortune altered its methodology in that year and, 
as a reflection of how the U.S. economic landscape was changing, began including 
service firms, not just industrials, energy, and manufacturing. As a result, roughly half of 
the list “disappeared” that year (more on this below). This chart captures the difference 
                                                        
14
 Bob Paladino, Innovative Corporate Performance Management: Five Key Principles to Accelerate 
Results 2 (Wiley 2011). 
15
 Arie de Geus, The Living Company 1 (Longview, 1997). 
16
 See http://fathom.info/fortune500/. The Fathom visualization allows you to sort the Fortune list by rank, 
revenue, and profit as well, which produces a fabulous picture of the within-list distribution of actual 
company performance. We made our own changes to the Fathom dataset because cosmetic tweaks to 
companies on the list, such as name changes, were sometimes wrongly counted in that visualization as 
instances of turnover. We have tried to be thorough in exercising editorial discretion over the data to 
catch such discrepancies. 
17
 See, e.g., Adam Davidson, “What Nail Polish Sales Tell Us About the Economy,” New York Times 
Magazine, December 14, 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/magazine/adam-davidson-
economic-indicators.html; Adam Davidson, “Why Do We Still Care About the Dow?” New York Times 
Magazine, February 12, 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/magazine/dow-jones-
problems.html?_r=1&ref=itstheeconomy.  
18
 Three years ago, we looked at the founding dates of current Fortune 500 companies, information which 
perhaps told a more interesting and useful tale of the American economy. See Dane Stangler, “The 
Economic Future Just Happened,” Kauffman Foundation, June 2009, at 
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/the-economic-future-just-happened.pdf. Of course, founding date 
information also can be used erroneously—at a conference a few years ago, one attendee claimed that 
three-quarters of the current Fortune 500 list companies did not even exist (let alone make the list itself) 
before 1965, a claim which is just plain wrong. 
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between two consecutive annual lists—some companies drop off the list and then 
reappear several years later, so a simple tally of annual turnover includes these repeat 
appearances. 
 
 
Figure 1. Source: Authors' calculations from Fortune 500, at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/index.html.  
As a prima facie matter, we can certainly see an apparent secular rise in annual 
turnover, with the early 1980s marking a decided inflection point, both in the level of 
turnover and its year-to-year volatility. This is followed, after 2002, in a slight fall. The 
overall trend for the 2000s, in fact, is downward, paralleling the 1960s and 1970s more 
than the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Next, Figure 2 illustrates change over time of specific list years and clearly shows an 
accelerating rate at which turnover occurs within the Fortune 500. 
 
 
Figure 2. Authors' calculations from Fortune 500. 
If we choose a starting year and an initial slate of companies in the Fortune 500 for that 
year, we can see at each successive year the number of original companies that still 
remain. Due to the constant change in the economy, this will necessarily decline. By 
choosing different starting years and plotting the curves of the decline from year to year, 
we can see how the pace of this turnover has quickened. For example, the list of 
Fortune 500 companies in 1955 (black curve) declines far more slowly than the list 
beginning in 1975 (red curve). 
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To see these numbers another way, Figure 3 plots standard deviations from the mean 
of 31.44. 
 
 
Figure 3. Authors' calculations from Fortune 500. The standard deviation is 8.05. 
This chart mirrors some of what we see in Figure 1, but brings a bit more order to the 
numbers. We can see, for example, that a rising level of annual turnover does not hold 
for every single year. The largest deviations, perhaps not surprisingly, appear to cluster 
together.  
 
It is tempting, when looking at the foregoing charts, to construct a narrative about the list 
and what it means. Glossing over annual variations, many commentators have 
compared turnover in terms of decades or periods. Popular literature and scholarship in 
economic history recall the 1950s and 1960s as an era of giant firms, the zenith of 
industrial capitalism, when John Kenneth Galbraith declared the entrepreneur to be 
finished in terms of playing any salient role in the economy. The 1980s and 1990s are 
set against these prior decades as an era of economic turmoil. To a certain extent, this 
is accurate and captured in the charts.19 As we will see, however, idiosyncratic events, 
clustered in time and economic sector, may be what is really driving turnover. 
 
To put this into any meaningful perspective, we first need to understand what it might 
mean. Is annual average turnover of thirty-one companies on the list of the 500 largest 
public companies, with occasional swings into the twenties and forties, a high rate of 
turnover? Low? To try to answer these questions, we looked at the work that several 
                                                        
19
 But this also can be very misleading. We could just as easily compare, say, the three-year periods of 
1956-8 and 1995-7 and claim that, because average annual turnover was the same (35), things haven’t 
changed much in forty years. 
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scholars have completed on churn among large companies to devise some comparable 
numbers. This is a horribly inexact process, because of the vast differences between 
older and more recent datasets, the changing nature of equity markets, the difference in 
what constitutes the largest firms over time, what industries are and aren’t included, and 
other issues. Nevertheless, we thought it important to at least try so that we did not 
examine Fortune numbers in a historical vacuum. 
 
What these scholars have found, predictably, is that turnover among large companies is 
not a unique hallmark of our era. The “supposedly exceptional turbulence in corporate 
rankings,” according to business historian Leslie Hannah, “is in fact also observed in the 
earlier periods of increasing national autarky and relative economic stagnation.”20 The 
reason is simple: “Corporate dinosaurs are ubiquitous in an ever-changing world.”21 
Because no company, no matter how successful, lasts forever, and because only a 
fraction of companies survive more than a few decades, turnover of varying degrees is 
entirely natural. The ebb and flow in the level of turnover may simply be that, ebb and 
flow, with no transcendent economic meaning. 
 
Hannah has looked at long-term trends in corporate change, finding that of the 100 
largest companies in the world in 1912, twenty remained among the 100 largest in 
1995. Of the original 100, fifty-four were headquartered in the United States, and of 
these companies, nine remained in the global top 100 in 1995. More than half of the 
American companies—twenty-nine—were no longer in existence, mostly due to 
acquisitions.22 Slightly more specifically, Robert Bruner reports that of the 501 firms 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1925, only sixty-five (13 percent) “existed in 
their independent corporate form in 2004.”23 (Thus, this also would include mergers and 
acquisitions.) 
 
Neil Fligstein has done some of the most heroic reconstructions, calculating decennial 
turnover—changes between the beginning and end of ten-year windows—among the 
100 largest American companies over a sixty-year period: 
 
Number of Firms Staying on, Coming to, or Leaving List of 100 Largest American 
Companies, 1919-1979, from Fligstein 
 
Decade 1919-29 1929-39 1939-48 1948-59 1959-69 1969-79 
Stayers 69 82 86 79 75 80 
Comers 31 18 14 21 25 20 
Leavers 31 18 14 21 25 20 
 
Table 1. Recreated from, Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Harvard, 1990), Appendix Table C.2, p. 335. 
                                                        
20
 Hannah’s observation also is important for understanding that higher levels of turnover should not be 
automatically equated with “good” economic developments. Leslie Hannah, “Marshall’s ‘Trees’ and the 
Global ‘Forest’: Were ‘Giant Redwoods’ Different?” in Naomi R. Lamoreaux, et al (eds.), Learning by 
Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries 261 (Chicago, 1999). 
21
 Leslie Hannah, “Marshall’s ‘Trees’ and the Global ‘Forest’: Were ‘Giant Redwoods’ Different?” in Naomi 
R. Lamoreaux, et al (eds.), Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries 254-5 (Chicago, 1999). 
22
 Leslie Hannah, “Marshall’s ‘Trees’ and the Global ‘Forest’: Were ‘Giant Redwoods’ Different?” in Naomi 
R. Lamoreaux, et al (eds.), Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries 254-5 (Chicago, 1999). 
23
 Robert F. Bruner, Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons that Rise Above the Ashes 1-2 (Wiley, 2005). 
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Our calculations for decennial turnover among the top 100 Fortune companies show an 
uptick to thirty-five newcomers in the 1980s and thirty-eight in the 2000s. (We excluded 
the 1990s because the mid-decade inclusion of service companies would inflate the 
number.)  
 
Such straightforward comparisons are misleading, of course. Prior periods of 
quiescence among large companies were, naturally, preceded by times of turnover. The 
“Great Merger Movement” from 1895 to 1904, in response to technological innovation 
and competition, led to a period of corporate stability, one that was in turn soon 
disrupted.24 Bruner observes that 1,800 firms disappeared during that period, resulting 
in the formation of ninety-three trusts.25 Consider, too, the turnover of the late 1920s, 
when new industries, on the back of electrification, came to be dominated by 
monopolies and oligopolies: 1,259 firms “disappeared” in mergers and acquisitions in 
1928, with an additional 1,100 in 1929.26 This includes both public and private 
companies, but represented a historically high level of activity—the number of M&A 
deals would not reach that level again for thirty years.27  
 
Underscoring the high churn, bear in mind that there were fewer companies overall at 
that time. The relative nature of turnover when there are more than 1,000 mergers and 
acquisitions—at a time when there were roughly 2 million corporations in the United 
States—might be comparable to twice that number in the 1980s, when the overall 
number of businesses also had doubled.28 A more accurate comparison, of course, also 
would have to account for the value of the M&A deals as a share of gross domestic 
product. Some research finds that, while takeover activity above 2 percent or 3 percent 
of GDP is “unusual,” during the height of the Great Merger Movement, it may have 
reached 10 percent—a level not achieved again until the 1990s.29  
 
Summing up, business turnover is not necessarily a recent phenomenon and has 
previously reached (relatively) high levels. Each period of stability or turnover is the 
product of a prior period and carries the seeds of future trends. This dovetails with the 
argument of scholars such as Carlota Perez on the long-run cycles of economic change 
driven by technology and finance.30 In some sense, turnover reflects the rhythms of 
capitalism. After all, from 1955 to 1959 (albeit only half a decade), average annual 
turnover was 6.5 percent of companies; in the 1960s and 1970s this fell to an average 
                                                        
24
 Donald J. Smythe, “A Schumpeterian View of the Great Merger Movement in American Manufacturing,” 
SSRN, April 2009.  
25
 Robert F. Bruner, Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons that Rise Above the Ashes (Wiley, 2005), p. 25. 
26
 Robert Sobel, The Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of American Business, 1914-
1992 (3
rd
 ed., 1993), p. 75, 85. According to Sobel, the number of “disappeared” firms plummeted to only 
107 in 1933. Id. 
27
 Robert F. Bruner, Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons that Rise Above the Ashes (Wiley, 2005), p. 2. 
28
 For a collection of long-run data, see George Thomas Kurian (ed.), Datapedia of the United States 
1790-2005: America Year by Year (Bernand, 2
nd
 ed., 2002), p. 437. 
29
 Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan, “Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United 
States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 
2001, p. 121. 
30
 Carlota Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden 
Ages (Elgar, 2003).  
11 
 
of less than 5 percent per year. It rose to 7.5 percent annually in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but fell back to the 1950s average in the 2000s, at 6.5 percent. 
 
III. Methodological Reasons Why Fortune 500 Turnover Might Not Be a Useful 
Indicator 
 
The overuse of the survivor technique, distorting our understanding of the 
process that has led to the present state of things, has affected several 
disciplines besides business history. If we merely observe that many of the firms 
that now dominate the economy are of ancient lineage, or that some of today’s 
top firms were also at the top a century earlier, we might conclude that giant firms 
are generally long-lasting; yet the stated observation is equally compatible with 
the hypothesis that some initially small firms grow rapidly to become large, while 
corporate giants have, over reasonably long periods, a poor survival rate. Our 
current knowledge of survivors dominates our impression of the typical 
experience, and their triumphs are lionized, while the history of the failures is 
forgotten or considered untypical.31 
 
We have seen that recent trends in Fortune 500 turnover have not necessarily been 
anomalous by historical standards. This doesn’t vitiate the actual meaning of rising 
turnover, but it should dampen the breathlessness of some observers. We now turn to 
methodological concerns. In particular, the utility of comparing Fortune list turnover 
across time could be limited because of the long exclusion of non-industrial service 
firms. Beginning in 1956, the magazine published a separate Service 500 “directory of 
the largest U.S. non-industrial corporations.”32 This included industries such as 
commercial banking, diversified financial services, health care, life insurance, retail, 
transportation, and utilities. The service sector has, of course, been a major part of the 
American economy since well before Fortune began its list in 1955. But, as noted, 
Fortune only began an integrated services and industrials list in 1994. Some of the 
rising volatility in the 1990s likely reflects this higher level of sectoral diversity as well as 
more inherent volatility among service sectors. From 1955 to 1993, during the 
“industrials-only” era, median turnover on the Fortune list was twenty-nine companies 
per year; from 1995 to 2011, after services were included, the median rose to thirty-nine 
per year. Research has shown that shifting sectoral composition has accounted for 
some of the rise in volatility among publicly traded companies over the past thirty years. 
Specifically, as measured by employment growth volatility, there has been a fall in the 
employment share of manufacturing and a rise in the employment shares of Services, 
FIRE, and Retail: “volatility among publicly-traded firms in FIRE and Services is 
considerably greater.”33 
                                                        
31
 Leslie Hannah, “Marshall’s ‘Trees’ and the Global ‘Forest’: Were ‘Giant Redwoods’ Different?” in Naomi 
R. Lamoreaux, et al (eds.), Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries 254-5 (Chicago, 1999). 
32
 See http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1985/06/10/65923/index.htm. See also 
Martha Groves, “Service Now Counts with Fortune 500,” Los Angeles Times, April 26, 1995, at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-04-26/business/fi-59111_1_fortune-services-companies.  
33
 Steven J. Davis, et al, “Volatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded versus 
Privately Held Firms,” in Daron Acemoglu, et al (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006 (2007) p. 
107. FIRE = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate. 
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This can be seen in Table 2, which charts the sectoral share of turnover in the four 
years following the methodological change in the composition of the list. Thus, in 1996, 
45.7 percent of the companies dropping off the list were industrials, which also 
accounted for 40 percent of new entrants. Service companies—reflecting everything 
from banks, airlines, and retail, to utilities, health care, and insurance—account for a 
larger share of exits and entries than industrial sectors. The one exception here is 1998, 
when services and industrials were even. Over time, as services come to account for a 
larger and larger share of the entire list, they naturally account for more turnover as 
well. 
 
Sectoral Share of Companies Entering and Exiting List 
 
Share of Companies 
Exiting List: 
Industrials 
Companies 
Exiting List: 
Services 
Companies 
Entering List: 
Industrials 
Companies 
Entering List: 
Services 
1995 40.5 59.5 -- -- 
1996 45.7 54.3 40 60 
1997 20.6 79.4 32.4 47.1 
1998 50 50 24.2 72.7 
1999 29.3 65.9 22.7 77.3 
 
Table 2. Industrial and Service Share of Turnover. Authors' calculations from Fortune 500. Totals may not add to 100 because of a handful of indeterminate cases. 
 
Arguably, then, the stock that many commentators put in Fortune 500 turnover is well 
overdone because, while they point to it as indicative of underlying economic ferment, it 
long reflected only certain dimensions of the American economy. It only reflected, 
moreover, industries in which it takes a great deal of time to build large companies and, 
thus, displace incumbents. This also is apparent from a comparative historical 
perspective because the United States already led Europe in manufacturing productivity 
by the end of the nineteenth century—it was the catch-up in service sector productivity 
that may have truly consummated the American century, just at the moment when 
Fortune initiated its non-services industrial list.34 Other researchers have shown that 
even during the supposedly staid 1950s and 1960s, there was plenty of innovation and 
churn in the U.S. services sector, especially in the growth—and globalization—of 
consultancies, advertising agencies, hotels, and fast food chains.35 (Of course, even if 
service sector companies do not necessarily experience higher turnover, simply casting 
a wider sectoral net should expectedly lead to higher apparent turnover because of 
broader economic representation—it increases the probability.) 
                                                        
34
 “Comparisons of nineteenth-century service industries like shipping and banking with their modern 
equivalents (airlines and financial services generally) suggest that (unlike in manufacturing) America was 
internationally uncompetitive in many service sectors in the later nineteenth century, but became the 
world productivity leader after World War II. … Thus, what happened in the twentieth-century American 
miracle was essentially that America got its act together in the non-manufacturing sector to consolidate a 
lead it already held (perhaps for essentially non-replicable reasons) in manufacturing (and agricultural) 
productivity.” Leslie Hannah, “The American Miracle, 1875-1950, and After: A View in the European 
Mirror,” Business and Economic History, vol. 25, no. 2, Winter 1995, p. 197, 202-203. 
35
 See Geoffrey Jones, “Multinationals from the 1930s to the 1980s,” in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Bruce 
Mazlish (eds.), Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History (Cambridge, 2005). 
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We also have concerns about the manner in which turnover is counted. Many 
companies enter and exit the list multiple times, with each one counting as an instance 
of “turnover.” This says more about relative revenue performance among companies 
than larger economic trends. The table below shows how many times companies have 
entered and exited the list over the last fifty years. So, 1,332 companies have come and 
gone once, while 248 companies have come and gone twice, and so on. Remarkably, 
one company has entered and exited the list on fourteen occasions!36 
 
Companies Coming and Going on the Fortune 500 
 
 
Likewise, we recognize that many of the “new” 
companies on the Fortune 500 moved up from 
rankings below number 500. For example, ten 
companies that can be counted as “new” top 500 
companies on the 2011 list were ranked 
somewhere between 501 and 525 the previous 
year. One natural consequence of this is that 
turnover on the Fortune 500 tends to be 
concentrated in the bottom of the list.37 Our 
supposition is that, were turnover on the Fortune 
1000 to be tracked, it would likely be lower than for 
the top half; but, since those data are only available 
since 2006, the comparison would not be nearly as 
robust. Nevertheless, movement in rank position is 
far greater for the lower-ranked Fortune 500 
companies than those near the top. 
 
Moreover, we need to keep in mind the ways in 
which the Fortune list gets formed. Commentators 
mostly take it to represent the rise and fall of companies 
and industries, and to some extent it does reflect that turnover. But it also reflects 
company-specific management decisions. Take, for example, the financial services 
company, MasterCard—it traces its founding to 1966 and has been a force in finance 
for decades, yet it only became a public company in 2006, duly turning up on the 
Fortune 500. Its rival, Visa, presents a similar example, going public in 2008 and 
immediately joining the ranks of the largest public companies. The appearance of these 
two companies on the Fortune 500 thus looks, by a simple count, as turnover, but 
cannot necessarily be used to infer anything about turnover at that point in time. It may 
                                                        
36
 We have other concerns as well that deserve fuller investigation: in some instances, a company’s 
appearance on the Fortune list does not match a cross-check with company history. 
37
 The longer a company has been around and larger it is, the harder it is to dislodge it from the ranking. 
Among cities this is known as Gibrat’s Law, where the growth of a city is proportional to its current size, 
and for career longevity, this is known as the Matthew Effect, where the more esteemed an individual is, 
the easier it is for her to accrue future success. While companies are distinct from these systems (and in 
some ways mirror biological species), there is far more churn in the lower-ranked Fortune 500 companies 
than those near to the top. This implies a regularity to how the ranking of a company is correlated with its 
mobility. See Michael Batty, “Rank Clocks,” Nature 444 (30) 592-596. 2006. 
Times Entered and 
Exited List 
Number of 
Companies 
0 416 
1 1332 
2 248 
3 49 
4 8 
5 8 
6 1 
7 1 
8 2 
9 0 
10 0 
11 0 
12 1 
13 0 
14 1 
Table 3. Authors' calculations from Fortune 500. 
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reflect management strategy, perceived conditions for an initial public offering (IPO), or 
something else, and the composition of the Fortune list is full of such variety. It doesn’t 
mean we can take annual turnover on the list at face value. 
 
IV. The Economic Meaning of Fortune 500 Turnover 
 
We risk, however, swinging too far in the opposite direction. The observations collected 
at the beginning of this paper may place too much emphasis on Fortune 500 turnover, 
but it would be folly to argue that the list doesn’t tell us anything. The ups and downs 
and trends in Figure 1 reflect, after all, underlying changes in technology, capital 
markets, and the divergent fortunes of different sectors of the economy. We may ask 
too much of the list by imposing a convenient narrative upon it, but the list does convey 
something meaningful.  
 
Over time, as noted, mergers and acquisitions have generated considerable turnover 
among any chosen set of large companies, whether public or private. While M&A 
activity is not precisely coincident with Fortune turnover, we know that mergers and 
acquisitions do account for movement on and off the list, as well as up the list, with the 
increased size that results. Mergers and acquisitions also tend to occur in waves—
economic historians count five merger waves in the past century:  
 
 The Great Merger Movement of 1895-1904; 
 The 1920s (some figures were offered above); 
 The late 1960s; 
 The 1980s; 
 The late 1990s. 
 
Additionally, the period 2002 to 2007 saw another historic rise in M&A activity.38 When 
we look at these waves in the aggregate, as with Fortune 500 turnover, we seemingly 
discern macro-patterns and connections across time. To be sure, each period shares 
certain attributes. But they differ in their particulars, and this variation—by year, by 
sector, by motivating force—is something we must bear in mind when seeking to 
generalize about Fortune turnover. The 1960s peak in M&A activity is known as the 
conglomerate wave, which resulted in sprawling enterprises that brought sundry 
disconnected businesses under one corporate umbrella.39  
 
Some of these conglomerates were taken apart in the 1980s wave, which contributed to 
the leap in Fortune 500 turnover during that decade. A gap opened between share 
                                                        
38
 “These waves roughly synchronize with equity market conditions and thus carry with them the cachet of 
excess, hype, and passion that swirl in the booms. … Every M&A boom has a bust.” Robert F. Bruner, 
Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons that Rise Above the Ashes 1 (Wiley, 2005). See also Michael J. De La 
Merced and Jeffrey Cane, “Confident Deal Makers Pulled Out Checkbooks in 2010,” New York Times 
Dealbook, January 3, 2011, at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/confident-deal-makers-pulled-out-
checkbooks-in-2010/. 
39
 See, e.g., John G. Matsusaka, “Takeover Motives During the Conglomerate Merger Wave,” The RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, Autumn 1993, p. 357. 
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prices and corporate book values, making it more lucrative to take the companies apart. 
Meanwhile, changing antitrust policy, deregulation across a variety of industries, and 
technological advance helped drive “a record number of divestitures, hostile takeovers, 
and transactions such as leveraged buyouts (LBOs).”40 Indeed, Sobel claims that during 
the 1980s, “more than a third of the Fortune 500 corporations were acquired, merged, 
restructured, or taken private.”41 Overall, it was estimated that more than 1,500 public 
companies were taken private in the 1980s—nearly the number of companies listed on 
the entire New York Stock Exchange in 1988.42 This was the age of junk bonds, when 
academics anticipated the “eclipse of the public corporation.”43 
 
Even these levels, however, were surpassed in the 1990s and 2000s: there were four 
times as many M&A deals in the 1990s as during the 1980s, spurred in part by rising 
M&A activity in Europe and Asia.44 In the 1990s, this wave was fueled to a great extent 
by information technology—at the height of the bubble, in 2000, there was far and away 
more merger activity in computer software, supplies, and services than in any other 
sector, with only manufacturing anywhere close.45 The M&A wave of the 2000s had 
more in common with the 1980s, with private equity transactions as a percentage of 
total U.S. stock market value reaching peaks in 1988 and 2006, when public-to-private 
transactions also increased.46 (See Appendix.) Private-equity-led public-to-private 
transactions not only hit high levels from 2005 to 2008, but also far outpaced, in 2007 
and 2008, the number of private-equity-backed initial public offerings.47 
 
                                                        
40
 Greg N. Gregoriou and Luc Renneboog, “Understanding Mergers and Acquisitions: Activity Since 
1990,” in Greg N. Gregoriou and Luc Renneboog (eds.), International Mergers and Acquisitions Activity 
Since 1990: Recent Research and Quantitative Analysis (2007), p. 3. 
41
 Robert Sobel, The Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of American Business, 1914-
1992 (3
rd
 ed., 1993), p. 269. 
42
 See Maggie Mahar, Bull! A History of the Boom and Bust, 1982-2004 (2004), pp. 51-53. 
43
 Michael C. Jensen, “Eclipse of the Public Corporation,” Harvard Business Review, September 1989. 
44
 Greg N. Gregoriou and Luc Renneboog, “Understanding Mergers and Acquisitions: Activity Since 
1990,” in Greg N. Gregoriou and Luc Renneboog (eds.), International Mergers and Acquisitions Activity 
Since 1990: Recent Research and Quantitative Analysis (2007), p. 3. 
45
 Paul A. Pautler, “Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions,” Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade 
Commission, September 25, 2001, at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp243.pdf.  
46
 See Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg, “Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Winter 2009, at 121. Public-to-private transactions occur when private equity 
firms take publicly traded companies private. 
47
 See David Weild and Edward Kim, Market Structure is Causing the IPO Crisis—and More, Grant 
Thornton, Capital Markets Series, June 2010. 
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Mergers and Acquisitions as a Percentage of Companies Exiting Fortune 500 
 
Year M&A Transactions as Share 
of Company Exits 
1995 21.6 
1996 31.4 
1997 47.1 
1998 52.2 
1999 43.9 
2000 61.2 
 
Table 4. Totals do not always add to 100 percent because there remain some exits for which reasons are indeterminate. 
Table 4 shows a small sample of years for which we estimated M&A volume as a 
percentage of overall turnover. The share not only varies widely (even in this small 
sample) but also tracks overall trends in M&A activity.48  
 
The reason that M&A activity matters so much for interpreting Fortune 500 turnover is 
that it not only moves in waves but also tends to be concentrated. During the Great 
Merger Movement, the 1920s, the 1980s, and the 1990s, mergers and acquisitions 
clustered within certain parts of the economy. For example, the top merger industries in 
the 1980s were completely different from those in the 1990s.49 This means that M&A 
waves and the sectoral concentration within them result more from industry shocks—
new technologies, deregulation, financial innovations—than broad macroeconomic 
changes.50 The same likely applies to Fortune turnover: what is interpreted as an 
indication of broad structural change is really a reflection of sector-specific 
developments.51 The two are related, of course. Structural economic changes result 
precisely from these micro changes, but we cannot seize on one number as their 
embodiment.52  
                                                        
48
 See also Alix Stuart, “Is Going Public Out of Style?” CFO Magazine, May 2011, at 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14570187/1/c_14570395.  
49
 The top industries in the 1980s were: Oil & Gas; Textiles; Miscellaneous Manufacturing; Non-
Depository Credit; and Food. During the 1990s they were: Metal Mining; Media and Telecommunications; 
Banking; Real Estate; and Hotels. See Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell, and Erik Stafford, “New Evidence 
and Perspectives on Mergers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2001, p. 103. 
50
 See Mark L. Mitchell and J. Harold Mulherin, “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and 
Restructuring Activity,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 41, 1996, p. 193. 
51
 We also cannot ignore global competition—the Fortune list is not restricted to economic developments 
in the United States. In particular, global competition rose in the 1980s and has only increased further: In 
2010, nearly half of the revenues of S&P 500 companies derived from outside the United States. Howard 
Silverblatt and Dave Guarino, “S&P 500: 2010 Global Sales,” Standard & Poor’s Research Report, July 
19, 2011, at http://www.standardandpoors.com/servlet/BlobServer?blobheadername3=MDT-
Type&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobheadervalue2=inline%3B+filename%3DSP500_GLO
BAL_SALES_2010_FINAL.pdf&blobheadername2=Content-
Disposition&blobheadervalue1=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobheadername1=content-
type&blobwhere=1243933233095&blobheadervalue3=UTF-8.  
52
 Some interpret all of this activity, micro and macro, as reflections of very real changes over time in the 
nature of the business firm: the period from the 1950s to the 1970s was that of the “classic” large, 
integrated firm of Chandlerian scale and scope. In the 1980s and 1990s, by contrast, boundaries shifted 
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In addition to mergers and acquisitions, changes in Fortune 500 turnover, particularly 
higher annual volatility, could be related to the burst of new public offerings in the 
1980s.53 The rising number of IPOs, in fact, could be a plausible driver of higher 
turnover among public companies—if there are more competitors, more targets for 
acquisitions, and the rise of newer industries represented by IPOs, then we would 
certainly see this reflected in Fortune turnover, particularly with a lag, after those newly 
public companies grew bigger.54 
 
 
Figure 4. Source: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.  
 
The causal link between these is probably quite attenuated. The relationship between 
IPOs and Fortune 500 turnover also will be complicated by the types of companies that 
go public as well as their age at the time of public offering. As shown in Table 5, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
with the deconstruction of horizontal and vertical integration and the rise of elongated supply chains and 
systems or “webs” of production. See Geoffrey Jones, “Multinationals from the 1930s to the 1980s,” in 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Bruce Mazlish (eds.), Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New 
Global History (Cambridge, 2005); Merritt B. Fox, “Promoting Innovation: The Law of Publicly Traded 
Corporations,” Capitalism and Society, Vol. 5, Issue 3, 2010, p. 1. 
53
 For recent historical data on initial public offerings, see Jay Ritter’s IPO Data compilation, at 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm; for a pithy overview of these market fads, see Burton G. 
Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (Norton, 10
th
 ed., 2011). 
54
 The three variables of Fortune 500 turnover, M&A activity, and IPOs are related, of course. In 1982, for 
example, women’s apparel maker Leslie Fay was taken private in a leveraged buyout. Four years later, it 
went public again and showed up on the Fortune 500 list in 1987. By 1993, the company declared 
bankruptcy. In terms of the list, the company slid from the 377
th
 spot in 1991 to 471
st
 in 1994 (with steep 
losses) and then off the list. See http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/The-Leslie-Fay-
Company-Inc-Company-History.html, and 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/snapshots/1994/3253.html.  
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median age of companies going public has “with only temporary aberrations … stayed 
remarkably constant at about 7 years.”55 
 
 
Percentiles of Firm 
Age at Time of IPO 25th 50th 75th 
1980-89 3 7 16 
1990-98 4 8 16 
1999-2000 3 5 9 
2001-2003 6 12 26 
All Years 4 7 15 
 
Table 5. Source: Tim Loughran and Jay Ritter, "Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?" Financial Management, Autumn 2004, p. 5. 
Other research has found that younger companies (defined as younger than ten or 
twenty years old) have been accounting for a greater share of total equity market 
capitalization.56 While there is likely some link between IPO trends and turnover trends 
(particularly if we were to look down the Fortune 1000), it is not as simple as comparing 
volume. Further, rapid growth of newly listed technology companies in the 1990s 
followed by greater entry by older companies (and, thus, presumably larger, such as 
MasterCard), may have accounted for part of the rise in Fortune turnover in the 2000s. 
(See Appendix.) 
 
Indeed, the phenomena of a changing IPO market and rising Fortune 500 turnover are 
related. As documented by several sources, over the past fourteen years there has 
been a falling share of small company IPOs and, in turn, a growing share of large 
company IPOs. During the 1990s, $50 million IPO transactions accounted for three-
quarters of all IPOs; since 1998, that has plunged and has been around one-third since 
2000.57 Meanwhile, there has been a growing rate of acquisitions rather than IPOs for 
small companies—for venture capital-backed companies, the split between the two exits 
has reversed. In the early to mid-1990s, one-third of VC-backed exits were M&A; 
beginning in 2001, that has consistently accounted for 80 percent of such exits.58 For 
those small companies that do go public, there has been a sharply higher incidence in 
the rate at which such companies are acquired within their first three years after IPO.59 
Similarly, small companies that have recently gone public have been involved in a much 
higher level of their own acquisitions in the past decade. Gao, Ritter, and Zhu call this 
an “eat or be eaten world” where, because of structural changes to markets in terms of 
                                                        
55
 Tim Loughran and Jay Ritter, “Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?” Financial 
Management, Autumn 2004, p. 5. 
56
 See, e.g., Jason Fink, et al, “IPO Vintage and the Rise of Idiosyncratic Risk,” Working Paper, February 
2005, at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~westonj/wp/ipoage.pdf.  
57
 See David Weild and Edward Kim, Market Structure is Causing the IPO Crisis—and More, Grant 
Thornton, Capital Markets Series, June 2010. 
58
 IPO Task Force, “Rebuilding the IPO On-Ramp: Putting Emerging Companies and the Job Market Back 
on the Road to Growth,” U.S. Department of Treasury, October 2011, at 
http://www.wsgr.com/PDFs/rebuilding-IPO.pdf.  
59
 See, Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter, and Zhongyan Zhn, “Where Have All the IPOs Gone?” Working Paper, 
November 2011, at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/Where%20Have_Nov4_2011.pdf.  
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payoffs and incentives, organic growth is less sought and less valued than acquisitive 
growth.60 Thus, small, growing companies either pursue an exit through acquisition 
rather than IPO, get acquired soon after going public, or, after their IPO, aggressively 
seek to grow through mergers and acquisitions. 
 
One result of this has been a sharp drop in the number of public companies in the 
United States because there has been more M&A activity without a consequent rise in 
IPOs.61 Greater Fortune turnover is both cause (M&A activity) and result (a focus on 
acquisitive growth rather than organic growth), and leads to greater variance in 
company growth rates and thus movement up, down, on, or off the list. 
 
Further, we might expect that greater volatility among the Fortune 500 is reflected in 
company performance. Higher turnover, for example—whatever the causes—could 
have resulted in stronger companies dominating the Fortune list. Conversely, higher 
turnover might be a consequence of higher variability in performance, with more 
unstable companies veering in and out of the list, driven in part by mergers and 
acquisitions. To investigate this, we looked at return on equity (ROE) over time. 
 
 
Figure 5. Source: Fortune 500. 1994 is omitted. The negative value for 2003 ROE is dragged down by one far outlying data point: an ROE of -8,600 percent. When that is 
excluded, the average ROE for 2003 is 6.21. The standard deviation also falls back near the 1990s trend. 
 
As can be seen, the mean and median ROE remain quite constant from 1957 to 2005, 
without movement in any particular direction. However, the variation in yearly ROE for 
the Fortune 500 companies has increased, beginning in the 1980s (see Appendix). 
 
                                                        
60
 See, Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter, and Zhongyan Zhn, “Where Have All the IPOs Gone?” Working Paper, 
November 2011, at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/Where%20Have_Nov4_2011.pdf.  
61
 See David Weild and Edward Kim, A Wake-Up Call for America, Grant Thornton, Capital Markets 
Series, November 2009. 
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V. The Relationship Between Fortune 500 Turnover and Macroeconomic Trends 
 
The most important and intellectually interesting point about rising turnover on the 
Fortune 500 list is that it occurred during the period, from the early 1980s to the mid-
2000s, that has come to be known as the Great Moderation. By many economic 
measures, volatility in the American economy fell dramatically after 1983. The 
composition of falling volatility and the reasons behind it have been the subject of 
numerous studies. Some economists subscribe to stories of improved monetary policy 
and financial innovation, while others seek to prove a “good luck” hypothesis. Others 
have shown that the downward trend in volatility—in real GDP growth, durable goods 
output, and other areas—after 1983 was perhaps the resumption of the long-term trend 
of the 1950s and 1960s rather than a new development.62 Davis and Kahn persuasively 
show that improved inventory management techniques played a large role in driving 
volatility downward in the 1980s and 1990s.63 
 
The juxtaposition with headline numbers on Fortune 500 turnover is stark: at the very 
moment that the volatility of aggregate economic output fell and stabilized, volatility 
among the largest American public companies rose, both in the aggregate and in 
annual variance. These two trends could be two sides of the same coin. First, reduced 
macro volatility, especially cheaper debt via low and stable interest rates, could have 
been a platform for greater turnover among large companies. This would have been 
given further fuel by things such as deregulation in a number of American industries in 
the 1970s and 1980s.64 Second, rising turnover among the largest public companies 
could have been the mechanism for moderated macro volatility because it would drive 
productivity and lead to the disappearance of unproductive companies. Improved 
inventory management, a key development in Davis and Kahn’s story, would be an 
example of this. More efficient supply chains mean more micro but less macro volatility. 
Individual firms differ on a wide variety of dimensions—those firms that more quickly 
adopted new technologies allowing them to better anticipate sales and implement just-
in-time inventory management would simultaneously drive out competitors (thus 
increasing turnover through both competition and M&A) and help smooth macro 
volatility. Theoretically, at least, higher efficiencies at the firm level should bring 
macroeconomic benefits along with higher volatility. 
 
                                                        
62
 For a comprehensive study and overview of the literature, see Steven J. Davis and James A. Kahn, 
“Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility of Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro 
Levels,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22, Fall 2008, pages 155-180. 
63
 See Steven J. Davis and James A. Kahn, “Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility 
of Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro Levels,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22, Fall 
2008, pages 155-180. 
64
 Only some sectors that experienced deregulation and other structural changes (foreign competition, 
trade embargoes, slowing demand) in the 1980s were represented on the Fortune list. This included 
textiles, petroleum, natural gas, steel, and food processing. But two of the most significant deregulatory 
events—airlines and trucking—were not reflected in the Fortune 500. See Mark L. Mitchell and J. Harold 
Mulherin, “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 41, 1996, p. 193. 
21 
 
More telling, and more useful for our purposes, have been the findings of economists 
that firm-level volatility has fallen nearly continuously in the United States for thirty 
years. Employment changes (positive or negative) across most firms in the economy 
became smoother, more moderate in the annual change. Yet there is a crucial 
distinction. There has been a steady downward trend in employment volatility among 
privately held companies but a marked increase, especially since the early 1990s, in the 
same measure among public companies. This “volatility convergence” in employment 
holds when the volatility of sales at public companies is measured over time.65 Some 
economists have attributed this to “a pronounced shift in the economic selection 
process governing entry into the set of publicly traded firms, and this shift greatly 
affected volatility trends among publicly traded firms.”66 In particular, the influx of new 
initial public offerings in the 1980s and 1990s drove rising volatility among public 
companies, especially since so many of those newly public companies grew so 
rapidly.67 It is estimated that, by 2000, firms that went public in the 1980s and 1990s 
accounted for 40 percent of employment in publicly traded companies.68 Take, for 
example, the computer company Dell—founded in 1984, it went public in 1988 and grew 
rapidly enough to make the Fortune 500 in 1992, subsequently vaulting up the list in the 
latter half of the decade. Davis et al show that the 1990s cohort of companies that later 
went public made huge employment gains by 2004, accounting for the largest 
employment share among publicly traded in an astonishingly short amount of time.69 
 
Turnover among the Fortune 500, then, is one reflection of that rising volatility among 
public companies, even as macroeconomic volatility fell overall.70 Yet rising turnover 
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among the largest public companies has not necessarily reflected anything unitary in 
the direction of the American economy.71 For one thing, the rising number of newly 
listed companies in the 1980s would not necessarily have had a direct impact on the 
Fortune list—no matter how compelling the narrative one wishes to tell—because of the 
composition of the list. At that point, service companies were still excluded and while not 
all of those newly public companies were service companies, some significant share of 
them certainly were. Rising Fortune 500 turnover in the 1980s was thus likely more a 
function of leveraged buyouts, deregulation, and new sources of competition. In the 
1990s, turnover rose to greater levels in part because of that prior wave of newly public 
companies as well as other trends, including another wave of mergers and acquisitions 
and the inclusion of service sectors. 
 
Behind all of this is the growth and diversification of financial services, which 
economists attribute for the higher listing rate of more volatile firms as well as, perhaps, 
greater risk-taking by individual firms. In this story, greater portfolio diversification—via 
mutual funds, easier securities trading, and greater market participation—allows readier 
access for younger (and riskier) companies looking to go public, induces listed firms to 
take greater risks because of the larger pool of available capital, and “weakens one 
motive for organizing production activity around large, internally diversified firms.”72 The 
“financialization” of the American economy since the late 1970s, therefore, would have 
underwritten higher levels of volatility among publicly traded companies and greater 
Fortune 500 turnover in numerous ways: new types of investors (especially the growth 
of pension funds and mutual funds), cheaper cost of capital, more IPOs from younger 
firms, and so on. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting analysis and visualization of the Fortune 500 (and 1000) 
and what it tells us about economic change and the U.S. economy would be one that is 
likely nigh impossible. This would show the threads of all companies that have fed into 
the list over the past 150 years, the origins, the combinations, the break-ups, and so on. 
Some of the giants on the list began as small, unassuming operations; others came into 
existence as giants from the start, whether as spinoffs, mergers, or well-capitalized new 
businesses. Thousands, perhaps millions, of companies are somewhere in the 
background of the largest companies now dominating the economy. It is in the total 
variety of these corporate histories—from the romantic to the humdrum—where we find 
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the real story of American capitalism and how economic growth happens, not in any 
summary statistic about turnover according to relative changes in revenues and market 
capitalization.73 Such a project would roll in parts of evolutionary economics, the 
metabolic theory of ecology, Zipf’s law, the detailed reconstruction of corporate 
histories, business lifecycle analysis, and so forth.74 
 
VI. Concluding Thoughts 
 
Something like the Fortune 500 list lends itself to irresistible generalizations about the 
economy. This is just the nature of history—the temporal brackets we place around 
events and the lines we draw between cause and effect each year usually dissolve in an 
incessant tide of new causes and effects. The list is unquestionably an important marker 
of American capitalism and several aspects of it can be used to chart historical change. 
Basic counts of the number of companies entering and exiting the list each year do 
illustrate rising turnover over time. For several reasons, this cannot be taken at face 
value.  
 
First, from a methodological standpoint, the exclusion of service companies for forty 
years, the repeat entry and exit of many companies, and the concentration of churn 
toward the bottom of the list, all mitigate the economic meaningfulness of turnover. 
Second, even taking turnover as methodologically meaningful, from a historical 
perspective the rise in average turnover—and rising volatility—echoes prior periods that 
predate the Fortune list. It cannot be treated, as it is by some, as historically unique. 
Finally, to the extent that turnover reflects underlying economic changes—mergers and 
acquisitions, initial public offerings, changes in financial markets—these need to be 
understood on their own terms, with temporal and sectoral concentration and various 
causes, not filtered through a single figure of turnover that glosses over the variation. It 
is economic variation, along a host of dimensions, that is most meaningful for economic 
evolution, not aggregate data. 
 
We must conclude by picking up the stick from the other end, as it were, and pointing 
out that the Fortune 500 and 1000 lists also represent something quite remarkable. In 
an economy in which thousands of businesses of all ages perish each year, and where 
only a fraction of companies can expect to survive more than a few decades, let alone 
grow to a large size, the persistence and growth and success of the companies on 
these lists is something worth admiring. True, the lionization of In Search of Excellence 
and Built to Last proved to be overdone, but, conversely, celebration of entrepreneurs 
(whether in terms of young, growing businesses or the canonization of small business 
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by politicians) can obscure the essential role of Fortune companies.75 Such a statement 
must strike one as odd because the daily life of most Americans is full of interactions 
with both types of companies—how could anyone overlook the presence of Walmart or 
Exxon or Apple?  
 
Nevertheless, as Michael Mandel has pointed out, it is a “now-heretical idea that scale 
is an advantage for innovation.”76 Take a look at how the United States compares 
against other countries, and you will see that big is not necessarily bad and small is not 
always beautiful. Statistics from the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) indicate that the U.S. economy derives a huge 
amount of benefit from giant firms.77 Meanwhile, the Italian economy—not exactly 
known for dynamism of late—is dominated by small companies. While no simple 
generalizations can capture international comparisons, it is equally clear, to Mandel’s 
point, that we cannot generalize about the relative importance of large and small 
companies.78 
 
If anything, the presence of larger and older companies has been growing in the United 
States, at least by some measures. This growing weight could be driven by Fortune 500 
turnover. For example, there are four times as many companies with more than 500 
employees today than in 1958, while the overall population of firms has only doubled 
over that time period. Twenty-seven percent of the workforce is in firms with more than 
10,000 employees, compared to 11 percent in 1958.79 In 1958, according to U.S. 
Census data, 55.1 percent of the American workforce was in “small” business, which 
the Census Bureau defines as firms with fewer than 500 employees. By 2009, this had 
fallen slightly to 49.4 percent.80 Correspondingly, the share of employment in young 
firms (five years and younger) has been falling, from one in five employees in 1982 to 
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one out of eight in 2009.81 Indeed, Davis et al conclude that shifts in the age distribution 
of employment, from younger to older firms, account for one-quarter of the decline in 
volatility among privately held firms since the late 1970s.82 On the harder to measure 
indicator of innovation, there appears to be some evidence that large companies have 
been accounting for a growing share of “disruptive” innovations. By one count, their 
share has risen from 25 percent to 35 percent over the past twenty years, twice the 
share of large companies from 1876 to 1980.83 
 
It also is not entirely clear that we should want or celebrate higher turnover among the 
Fortune 500. Do we want our largest, and seemingly most stable, companies zooming 
up and down the rankings? We want them to continuously innovate and even reinvent 
themselves (as most of the top companies have done), but not bouncing up and down 
in value.84 Here, mergers and acquisitions are particularly valuable in terms of economic 
restructuring. Yet not all turbulence is created equal—in his sample of 2,800 M&A 
transactions from 1985 to 2000, Robert Bruner found that the very best and, especially, 
the very worst, value-destroying deals of the entire period were concentrated in the “hot 
market” of 1998 to 2000. The high Fortune 500 turnover in these years was thus not 
necessarily a good thing in terms of shareholder value and economic benefits.85  
 
Volatility among companies, moreover, also has implications for employees. 
Economists have found that even as macro volatility fell during the Great Moderation, 
this was not necessarily felt at the household level.86 Income and consumption volatility 
actually rose, reflecting a rise in earnings uncertainty for individuals and deteriorating 
economic security despite apparent macroeconomic stability. This is another potential 
consequence of Fortune 500 turnover, especially as they come to play a larger and 
larger economic role. 
 
None of this denies the important role of new and young and growing companies, of 
course. Most of the Fortune 500 companies began as small firms. Part of the reason for 
rising turnover is undoubtedly related to the greater role that younger companies have 
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played in the U.S. economy over the past three decades, challenging incumbent firms. 
And, of course, there is a symbiotic relationship between young firms and large, 
established corporations. Many startups find their first customers in big companies, and 
many of the ideas coming out of large firms would not otherwise find commercial 
potential without entrepreneurs. Turnover among America’s largest public companies—
whether rising or falling, whether relative or absolute—only underscores the resilience 
of giant corporations and their essential role in economic growth. 
 
Finally, Fortune 500 turnover and the trends and developments related to it are one 
more example of how mind-bendingly and marvelously complex the world of capitalism 
can be, with not only constant churn in terms of entry and exit but also combinations, 
divestitures, cosmetic alterations (name changes), strategic shifts, break-ups, 
acquisitions, and so on. This reality goes far deeper than what we can glean from 
aggregate numbers, and in their work, economists do not always convey this 
complexity. Those in the midst of it—managers, executives, employees, consultants—
either do not seek the big picture or are prone to breathless extrapolations of small 
samples into the latest trends. But, this messiness is where prosperity is made. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Founding Dates of Fortune Companies 
 
We must remember that American capitalism did not come into existence in 1955—the 
initial Fortune 500 list reflected the preceding years of turnover and change, just as the 
list of 1912 was the outcome of two decades of churn. What passed for relative stability 
in the 1960s may have simply been another lull between waves of turnover. Still, just as 
the 1960s witnessed great progress in the service sector, it also was far from a dull 
decade in terms of future Fortune companies. 
 
 
Figure A-1. Source: Authors' calculations from Fortune 500, at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/index.html.  
 
Here we see that two decades during which turnover on the list was relatively quiescent, 
the 1960s and 1970s, simultaneously saw the provenance of a large number of future 
Fortune 500 companies. This comparison, in and of itself, tells us nothing—there is 
likely no causal link we should draw between these numbers. 
 
Turnover among big companies in the United States is sometimes compared to a static 
situation in Europe: “Eight of the 25 largest firms in the United States in 2003 did not 
exist or were very small in 1960. All of the largest firms in Europe in 1998 were already 
large in 1960.”87 Fair enough, but is 1960 a meaningful year of demarcation? How much 
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earlier were those European firms founded? For context, let’s take the entire 2011 
Fortune list: 70 percent of the companies were founded prior to 1960. 
 
The Role of Private Equity 
 
 
Figure A-2. Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, "Private Equity: Recent Growth in Leveraged Buyouts Exposed Risks That 
Warrant Continued Attention," September 2008, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08885.pdf. 
 
We recognize that public-to-private transactions are far from the majority of leveraged 
buyouts (and these move in waves over time), and that a return to the public markets by 
LBO firms is far from the most common outcome.88 Indeed, while going-private 
transactions were significant in the 1980s, they were almost nonexistent in the 1990s.89 
Not every LBO affects the large public companies ranked by Fortune—during this 
period, public-to-private buyouts were 13 percent of all buyouts but 58 percent of total 
deal value. But there were likely enough deals to make a difference as to annual 
Fortune list turnover. Reverse LBOs, moreover, also would cause a rise in large-
company turnover, and some studies suggested that these “resulted in more companies 
entering public markets during this period [2000-07] than exiting following private equity 
acquisitions.”90 
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Initial Public Offerings 
 
 
Figure A-3. Source: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.  
Jay Ritter and others have documented that the falloff in IPO activity since 2000 has 
been due more to lower returns to small company IPOs and a rise in strategic 
acquisitions rather than regulatory activity.91 
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Return on Equity: Standard Deviation 
 
 
Figure A-4. Standard deviation for each list year of return on equity for Fortune 500. Source: www.fortune.com.  
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